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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the conformity of gender quotas with the
constitutional concept of equality. The importance of this examination is to answer
the question whether gender quotas are constitutional. My argument is that gender
quotas are constitutional because they address de facto inequality by making women’s
representation equal to men’s representation. I argue that Egypt has a history of
adopting quotas to guarantee the representation of disadvantaged groups. I also tie the
constitutionality of the gender quota to the current political landscape where the
Muslim Brotherhood controls the state. I argue that gender quotas will not, most
probably, be adopted under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, as they do not
believe in equal representation for women.
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I. Introduction
Debates on quotas to address women’s political representation are quite fierce. Not all
women support such quotas, nor do all feminists. In Egypt, over the past decade,
quotas that aim to tackle women’s political representation in the legislature
(hereinafter, “the People Assembly”) have been the subject of hesitant adoption and
quick annulment or abolition.
This thesis focuses on the debates behind quotas that aim to tackle women’s
political representation (hereinafter, “gender quota(s)”).

Two main issues are

believed to hinder the quota. First, there is the question of the constitutionality of the
quota. It is widely believed that the quota is unconstitutional as it violates the
principle of equality or equal opportunity between men and women. In fact, the quota
debates lie at the intersection of several legal, moral, and social concepts, namely
equality, agency and gender. By defining and addressing these key concepts upon
which the quota may or may not ground its legitimacy, this thesis aims to shed light
on the constitutionality of quotas in well-established constitutional democracies.
Second, beyond this theoretical and legal approach to understanding the quota,
this thesis aims to explain that equally important in the quota debate is the specific
historic and legal contexts in which the quota is recommended. By examining how
the historical and legal ascension of political Islam has generally affected women’s
political participation in Egypt, the largest nation in the heart of the Muslim Arab
world, this thesis argues that the quota is an important, if not necessary, tool to tackle
gender discrimination in societies. In doing so, this thesis will discuss how Islamists’
views on women’s political participation, and more specifically on quotas, has been
quite detrimental to women’s political participation as a whole as well as the survival
of the gender quota in Egypt.

The thesis then shifts to critiquing contemporary

Islamists’ stance with the actual religious texts they rely upon to justify restricting
women’s political participation. 1
Most basically, quotas, or ‘political quotas’, are considered an immediate
remedy to the fact of under-representation of women in politics, especially in Egypt
where women have historically remained almost non-existent in political public

1

By “Islamist” I refer to the political Islamic Party.

affairs. 2 This thesis discusses the quota in the context of the Egyptian People’s
Assembly (hereinafter, “the People’s Assembly”), the main lawmaking body in
Egyptian politics.
In other words, the quota remedy to the problem of women’s political
participation (or lack thereof) is an affirmative action that aims for the equality of
result.

Electoral gender quotas are a form of affirmative action that aim for the

equality of result in the lawmaking body of a society rather than equality of
opportunity to become a representative in that lawmaking body. Nevertheless, these
actions consist of measures intended to guarantee an increased representation of
women. With regards to equality, the idea of guaranteeing the selection of women’s
representatives in elections has engendered controversy. It is the case as they are
viewed as bypassing competitiveness and hence as ignoring the merit principle which
ensures that the best person will be selected. 3 In parallel to this merit question, there
is also the persistent question of why women are necessary vehicles to represent other
women in the People Assembly. These questions will be addressed in turn in Chapter
Two, yet the main question this thesis aims to answer is whether women’s presence in
the People’s Assembly is vital for Egyptian democracy.

A distinction is made

between an understanding of representation as “acting on behalf of” and an
understanding of representation as “standing for.” 4 For “acting on behalf of” the
elected representative is a trustee, authorized to use her judgment when acting on
behalf of electors; whereas “standing for” means she is a delegate strictly attached to
those who elect her.

2

In the three main organs of the State: the Judiciary, the Legislative and the Executive,
women’s number reflects a potential formal resistance to their political participation. In the
Egyptian judiciary, women have been able to become judges in normal courts only very
recently. In 2007, forty-two women judges were appointed to join the judicial system. In the
legislative body - the People’s Assembly of 2005 - there were nine women members of
Parliament of which four were elected and five were appointed by the former President
Mubarak, with an overall percentage of less than 2%. Finally, in the Executive body women
held three ministries of the State’s thirty-two ministries, i.e. the Ministry of Manpower and
Immigration (held by Aisha Abdel Hady), the Ministry of International Cooperation (held by
Fayza Abul Naga) and the Ministry of State for Family and Population (held by Mosheera
Mahmoud Khattab). See Egypt State Information Service, Women in the Executive Authority,
available at: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=2259 (entered May 16, 2010)
3
Mala N. Htun & Mark P. Jones, Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-Making:
Electoral Quotas and Women’s Leadership in Latin America 50 (Nikki Craske and Maxine
Molyneux ed., Houndmills Palgrave 2002)
4
Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 60-92 (Berkeley: University of
California Press 1972).

2

In Egypt, quotas addressing women’s representation in the People’s Assembly
have been legally adopted twice. Egypt has adopted gender quotas in the form of
statuary or legislative reserved seats. Gender quotas were first adopted in 1984, yet
they were was soon after abolished in 1987 by a decision of the Supreme
Constitutional Court (hereinafter, “SCC.”). 5 In 2008, the quota was nevertheless
reinstated under Mubarak’s regime, yet it was suspended with the January 2011
Revolution. Thus, a hesitant adoption and a quick abolition has been the fate of
quotas addressing women’s representation in the People’s Assembly.
This thesis ultimately aims to address the legitimacy and legality of quotas and
the future of Egyptian women’s political representation in light of political the rise of
political Islam in the Egyptian state. 6 In Chapter One, the origins, the definition and
types of quotas used in different constitutional regimes will be presented and
compared to the quota adopted in Egypt’s political landscape. In Chapter Two, legal
feminists theories and their relationship to women’s quotas will be discussed. In
Chapter three the constitutional history of women’s rights will be presented. It will be
followed by an analysis of the SCC’s decision regarding the legality of the quota to
argue for the constitutionality of gender quotas. In Chapter Four, the historical-legal
relationship of women’s political participation in light of the ascension of political
Islam in Egypt will be discussed to argue for the consideration of specific historical
and legal conditions in the evaluation of the legal quota.

5

No 131/6Q.
By “Islamisation” I mean that an Islamic Political Party heads the state with a main political
agenda of applying Islam—from its’ perspective--as a public policy.
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II. Origins and Types of Gender Quota
In the first section, of this chapter the origins of gender quotas will be presented. In
the second section, the definition and different types of gender quotas will be
presented.
A. Origins of Gender Quota
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of new patterns of political
representation. On one hand, political transformations around the world have incited
reflection on the question of institutional and constitutional design. 7 For example, in
Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa, reformers have devised new political
measures in light of democratic transitions. On the other hand, new scholarship has
challenged the prevailing conventions of liberal democracy by rethinking the means
and ends of the representative process. 8 Instead of viewing politics as a neutral arena
in which all citizens play an equal role, this scholarship argues that liberal political
arrangements create systematic distortions in public policies and in equal political
engagement. 9
The developments have led to different variations in political participation.
The most common reforms have been provisions to increase women’s representation.
Most of these provisions take the form of quota policies aimed at increasing women’s
selection and election to political office. 10 The origins of many of these policies can
be traced back to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in
Beijing in September 1995.

The resulting Beijing Declaration and Platform of

Action, called on governments to take measures to ensure women’s equal access and
full participation in politics. 11

While quotas appeared before this date, 12 the

7

Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform
Worldwide 3 (Oxford University Press 2009).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
http://www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/BEIJIN_E.PDF
12
In the early 1990s, some countries established 30 percent quotas for women in their local
governments. However, it is not know where the 30 percent figure originates. But one theory
links it with the concept of a ‘critical mass,’ a term used in some research to suggest that
women need to form a large minority of all legislators before they can make a difference in
public policy. Sarah Childs & Mona Lena Krook, Should Feminists Give up on Critical Mass
A Contingent Yes, 2 Politics & Gender 522, 522-530 (2006).

4

importance of this event is seen in the patterns of quota adoption around the world.13
Between 1930 and 1980, only ten countries established quota provisions, followed by
twelve countries in 1980s. However, in 1990s quotas were adopted in more than fifty
countries, and after 2000 nearly forty more adopted the quota. 14
The use of quotas as a tool for attaining equal political participation is often
referred to as the Beijing Platform. The Beijing Platform signifies a shift regarding
women’s empowerment in politics. First, it discusses “discriminatory attitudes and
practices” and “unequal power relations” that lay as the main reasons for the underrepresentation of women in politics, a discussion that is labeled “discourse of
exclusion.” 15

Previously, the focus was on women’s lack of interest or lack of

resources to participate in politics. Now, the focus has shifted to the institutional and
cultural mechanisms of exclusion that have prevented women from accessing the
decision–making level in politics.

The responsibility for promoting women’s

positions in politics has also shifted from the individual woman to the institutions that
are expected to rectify the causes of women’s under-representation. 16 Second, the
demands for a “minimum level of representation” were abandoned and replaced by a
new discourse of “equal representation.” Thus, the aim is no longer to have “more
women in politics” rather to have “equal participation” and “equitable distribution of
power and decision making at all levels.” 17
Finally, the Beijing Platform suggests affirmative actions as a means to reach
the goal of equal representation. However, the word “quota” was not used. For
governmental and public administration positions, it recommends that the world’s
governments use “specific targets and implementing measures […] if necessary
through positive actions.” 18

Also, for elected positions, it recommends that

governments “take measures, including, where appropriate, in electoral systems that
encourage political parties to integrate women in elective and non-elective public
positions in the same proportion and at the same levels as men.” 19 Furthermore, it
recommends that political parties should “consider examining party structures and
13

Krook, supra note 7, at 6.
Id.
15
Drude Dahlerup, Women Quotas and Politics 5 (Drude Dahlerup ed., Routledge 2007)
(2006).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Fourth United Nations World Conference in Women in Beijing in 1995, article 190 a.
19
Id.
14
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procedures to remove all barriers that directly or indirectly discriminate against the
participation of women.” 20

The Beijing Platform signifies a new discourse that

focuses on the mechanism of exclusion through institutional practices, setting gender
balance as the goal and demanding that governments and political parties commit
themselves to take affirmative actions.
Gender quotas take a wide range of forms in different countries. In fact,
interesting theories have emerged to explain quota adoption. 21 These theories explain
it by identifying the principal actors in quota campaigns and the actors’ reasons for
pursuing political reforms. 22 Literature on gender quotas proposes four different
perspectives on quota adoption: (1) women mobilize for quotas to increase women’s
representation, (2) political elites recognize political advantage in pursuing quotas, (3)
the connection between quotas and established political norms or the consistency of
quotas with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation, (4) and the
support of international organizations. These theories, taken together, present
conflicting views as they draw attention to distinct actors and motivations for quota
reform. 23 They also suggest that none of these accounts, on their own, explain all
cases of quota reform. 24 Some accounts characterize only some cases, and at the
same time, some cases may tell only part of the story that engages several of these
narratives. 25 Also, each theory may constitute only one element within a sequence of
events e.g. women’s mobilization may influence and, thus, precede political parties
decision-making. 26

20

Id.
These explanations are made based on individual case study of countries. However, they
are grouped together to determine the general answer for the question of “who and why?” in
relation to the adoption of gender quota. For example in Germany quota proposals originate
with women’s groups inside the political parties. However, it was only when political elites
perceived gender quotas adoption as an effective way to compete favorably with other parties
that the gender quotas were adopted. Another example is Morocco where the provision of
equality in the constitution prevented the adoption of quota. However, women’s movement
pushed political parties to make a gentlemen’s agreement to adopt quota despite the
constitutional blockage. Thus, each case is different with regards to the actors and the reasons
for adopting quotas.
22
Krook, supra note 7.
23
Id. at 26.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
21
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The majority of research on gender quota adoption considers women as the
source of quota proposals. According to this first theory, the call to nominate more
women in politics never occurs without the prior mobilization of women, even when
male politicians or activists are responsible for the decision to adopt quotas. 27
Women’s movements form varies across cases and may include grassroots women’s
movements that work nationally and internationally to promote women’s political
participation. 28 It also includes women’s organizations inside political parties that
propose specific quota policies, 29 individual women inside parties who encourage
male leaders to adopt a quota, 30 and women involved with the national women’s
organizations that support gender quotas as a means for creating a women-friendly
policy change. 31
Other theories suggest the significant role of political elites and political
parties, usually consisting of males, and the strategic advantages they perceive for
adopting gender quotas. For some, the reason is party competition, noting that elites
tend to adopt gender quotas only when their electoral rivals adopt them. 32 Others note
that political parties adopt gender quotas to overcome a long period in opposition or a
dramatic decrease in popularity by closing the gap in support among female voters.

33

Scholars have linked the adoption of gender quotas to emerging notions of
equality and representation. They justify this link depending on how they relate
gender quotas to the reigning political regime.

Some see gender quotas as an

extension of the ideas of equality and fair access by noting that quotas in left-wing
27

See Lisa Baldez, Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in
Mexico, 29 Legislative Studies Quarterly 231 235-240 (2004). Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598632
28
See Gihan Abou Zeid, The Arab Region: Women’s Access to the Decision-Making process
across the Arab Nation, in WOMEN, QUOTAS, AND POLITICS 168, (Drude Dahlerup ed.,
Routledge 2007).
29
See Dan Connell, Strategies for Change: Women & Politics in Eritrea & South Africa, 25
Review of African Political Economy 189, 189-206 (1998).
30
See Miki Caul Kittilson, Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments: Women and Elected
Office in Contemporary Western 16 (Parliaments and Legislatures ed., Columbus: Ohio State
University Press 2006).
31
See Mark Jones, Increasing Women’s Representation Via Gender Quotas, 16 Women and
Politics 75 78-98 (1996).
32
See Miki Caul, Political Parties and The Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A CrossNational Analysis, 63 The Journal of Politics 1214, 216-1229 (2001). However, there are
other scholars who suggest that competition among parties may in fact work against the
selection of female candidates, as parties that are uncertain about electoral outcome favors the
traditional male politician support.
33
Eva Kolinsky, Political Participation and Parliamentary Careers: Women’s Quotas in
West Germany, 14 West European Politics 56, 56-72 (1991).

7

parties match their more general goals of social equality. 34 Others associate quota
adoption with democratic transformation by noting that the demands for gender
quotas emerge during periods of democratic transition as a means for guaranteeing the
representation of traditionally underprivileged groups or establishing the national or
international legitimacy of the new regime. 35 However, these accounts neglect the
fierce opposition gender quotas receive based on equality norms. Opponents to the
gender quotas argue that proposed quotas for women discriminate against men and
therefore should be considered unconstitutional or illegal. 36
Finally, the fourth theory refers to the role of international norms and
transnational information sharing in shaping national quota debates. 37 This research
proposes that quota policies originate in international meetings and conferences that
generate recommendations for member states to improve women’s access to political
decision-making. It also determines the most two influential documents in this regard
to be the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, passed in 1979, and the Beijing Platform for Action, approved in 1995, and
elaborated within the United Nations. Other international organizations have issued
similar resolutions in recent years adopting quotas for women including the InterParliamentary Union, the Socialist International, the Council of Europe, the European
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth,
the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and the
Organization of American States. 38

In the majority of cases, gender quotas are

noticed to be adopted in the wake of recommendations issued by international
organizations, especially in the years following the United Nations’ Fourth World
Conference in Beijing in 1995. 39 However, this theory does not trace the explicit
causal relation between international norms and national quota adoption policy.
Instead, they limit their observations to specific cases of quota adoption that follow an
international event.
34

Id.
See Gretchen Bauer and Hannah E. Britton, Women in African Parliaments, (Gretchen
Bauer and Hannah Britton ed., Boulder: Lynee Rienner 2006).
36
Marila Guadagnini, Gendering the Debate on Political Representation in Italy: A difficult
Challenge, in STATE FEMINISM AND POLITICAL PRESENTATION 140 (Joni Lovenduski ed.,
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005).
37
Krook, supra note 7, at 24.
38
Id.
39
Id.
35
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B. Types of Gender Quotas
Quotas in politics involve setting up a percentage or number for the representation of
a specific group. 40 Quotas are used as a measure to increase the representation of
historically under-represented groups. Gender quotas are defined as “fixed number or
percentage of minority group or women needed to meet the requirements of
affirmative action.” 41 By enforcement, it requires that women constitute a certain
number or percentage of the members of an institution or a body. 42
Gender quotas may be adopted to require a minimum representation for both
sexes, for example of no more than sixty percent and of no less than forty percent for
each sex. According to such gender-neutral quotas, it sets a maximum for both sexes,
which quotas for women do not. 43
Gender quotas are considered to be part of a new equality policy representing
a new shift from “equal opportunity” to “equality of results.” Affirmative action
implies measures that target structural discrimination or that makes it possible to leap
over the barriers. Thus, it is considered as a fast track equality policy. Given the
limitations of equal opportunity policies, in recent decades many countries have
turned to affirmative action policies. Positive action policies for legislative office
include three main strategies: the use of reserved legislative seats, where only women
can be appointed or elected, established by electoral law or by the national
constitution; the use of legislative or statutory gender quotas controlling the
composition of candidate lists for all parties in each country, established by electoral
law or by the national constitution; and also the use of voluntary gender quotas in the
process employed within particular parties and political groups to nominate
candidates, established by internal party rules, recruitment procedures, or party
constitutions. 44
Successful examples where these strategies have substantially increased
women’s representation in diverse societies and cultures worldwide range from India
40

Dahlerup, supra note 15.
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quota
42
Drude Dahlerup, Increasing Women’s Political Representation: New Trends in Gender
Quotas, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 141 (Julie Ballington and Azza
Karam ed., International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2005).
43
Krook, supra note 15, at 19.
44
Id.
41
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to Morocco, South Africa, Pakistan, Jordan, Britain, Belgium, and Argentina.
Proponents argue that positive action policies are the most effective strategy for
achieving gender balance. Evidence confirms that in many cases women have made
rapid gains. Yet successful implementation depends upon many detailed matters,
such as the legal penalties for non-compliance. 45
There are three main types of gender quotas. The first type takes the form of
reserved seats in parliament.

The second type takes the form of legislative or

statutory gender quotas and the third type takes the form of voluntary party gender
quotas.
Reserved seats are often created by reforms to the constitution or occasionally
by electoral law creating separate rolls for women, designating separate districts for
female candidates, or distributing seats for women based on each party’s proportion
of the popular vote. 46 This strategy has been the most widespread type of quota in
Africa and the Arab region. 47 This type is currently used for the lower house of the
national parliaments in Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Botswana, Taiwan, Lesotho, and Tanzania. 48
Egypt employed this type of gender quotas. The first time, in 1983, the
electoral law established a proportional list system by which all the candidates must
be party-listed. 49 The law also divided the country into 48 electoral constituencies of
which 31 constituencies reserved one seat for women.

In these thirty-one

constituencies, a woman had to be on the list.
In 2008, when the gender quota was adopted for the second time, the electoral
law stated reserved 64 seats for women by creating women constituencies. In these
constituencies, only women competed with each other. Morocco established this type
of quota in 2002, which allowed 9.2 percent of women representation or 30 of 325. 50
And in Egypt the quota allowed 8.3 percent of women’s representation or 30 of 360 in
1979 and 14.3 percent or 64 of 445 in 2010.51 This policy guarantees a minimum
number of women in elected office. Reserved seats differ from party and legislative
quotas as they mandate a minimum number of female legislators instead of simply
45

Id.
Krook, supra note 7, at 6.
47
Abou Zeid, supra note 28, at 176.
48
Dahlerup, supra note 15.
49
Law 114 for 1983.
50
Abou Zeid, supra note 28, at 175.
51
Id.
46
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setting a percentage of women among political candidates. 52
In spite of its strengths, critics suggest this strategy may not enable women to
exercise genuine power. Those appointed by the president, prime minister, or party
leader lack the democratic legitimacy that arises from an independent electoral or
organizational base. Their appointment by party leaders can be used to reinforce
control of parliament by the majority party, especially in countries with limited
democratic rights and civil liberties where power is concentrated in the hands of the
executive.
Legislative gender quotas are mainly found in developing countries especially
in Latin America, and in post-conflict countries in the Middle East. 53 Legislative
gender quotas specify that women must constitute a minimal proportion of
parliamentary candidates or of elected representatives within each party or group.
These quotas may be enacted by law or by the national constitution. Quotas have
been used for legislative candidates and for public bodies such as government
commissions. Statutory gender quotas imposed by the law or the constitution applies
to all parties and groups within a country. They are similar to party quotas in that
they address party selection processes but differ in that they are adopted by national
parliaments to require that all parties nominate a certain proportion of female
candidates. As such, they are mandatory provisions that apply to all political groups
rather than only those who choose to adopt a quota.

Similar to party quotas,

legislative quotas call for women to form between 25 to 50 percent of all candidates.
Nevertheless, they consist of a broader processes of reform focused on changing the
language in constitutions and electoral laws rather than the content of individual party
regulations. Furthermore, like party quotas, legislative quotas are implemented in
varied ways depending on the electoral system, applying alternatively to party lists or
to a broader group of single-member districts. 54
Given their status as laws, legislative quotas are distinctive in that they impose
sanctions for noncompliance and are subject to some degree of oversight from
external bodies. The effective implementation of legislative quotas depends upon
multiple factors, including how statutory mechanisms are implemented, the level of
the gender quota specified by law, whether the rules for party lists regulate the rank
52

Krook, supra note 7, at 6.
Id. at 21
54
Id. at 8.
53

11

order of women and men candidates, whether party lists are open or closed, and also
the penalties associated with any failure to comply with the law. These policies prove
least effective when the laws are designed as symbolic window-dressing more than as
de facto regulations; the regulations specify that a certain proportion of women have
to be selected for party lists, but they fail to specify their rank order so that female
candidates are listed at the bottom. 55
Finally, party quotas are the most common type of gender quota. They were
first adopted in the 1970s by a limited number of socialist and social democratic
parties in Western Europe. Currently, they are the most common type of formal
quotas in the “West” as they are adopted in fourteen countries of the region. 56 In
some of these countries they exist alongside other types of quotas to promote
women’s representation. 57 International IDEA’s Global Database of Quotas for
Women estimates that 181 parties in 58 countries use gender quotas for electoral
candidates for national parliaments.

This practice is common throughout

Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Latin America. These policies are also effective;
for example in Europe on average about one third or 33 percent of the elected
representatives in national parliaments are female in parties using voluntary gender
quotas, compared with only 18 percent in parties that do not follow this policy. Party
quotas are measures that are adopted voluntarily by individual party practices, internal
regulations, aiming to attain a certain proportion of women among its candidates to
political office.

58

This strategy typically mandates that women constitute between 25

and 50 percent of parties’ electoral lists. 59

55

Id.
Mona Lena Krook, Joni Lovenduski & Judith Squires, Western Europe, North America,
Australia and New Zealand: Gender Quotas in the context of citizenship models, in WOMEN,
QUOTAS, AND POLITICS 194, (Drude Dahlerup ed., Routledge 2007).
57
See Petra Meier, The Mutual Contagion Effect of Legal and Party Quotas: A Belgian
Perspective, 10 Party Politics 583 583-600 (2004).
58
Krook, supra note 7, at 7.
59
Id.
56
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III. Theoretical Justifications of the Quota
In this chapter, the theoretical arguments concerning gender quota will be discussed to
argue in favor of the adoption of gender quotas. In Section one, the debate over the
legality of gender quota will be discussed.

In Section two, a discussion of the

Egyptian experience with regards to the adoption of gender quotas will be presented.
To further strengthen the argument for gender quotas, other Egyptian parliamentary
quotas surviving for sixty years without facing the same fate that gender quotas face
in Egypt, will also be discussed.
The arguments for and against quotas stem from three theoretical strains:
gender theory, representation theory, and equality theory.
A. Gender Theory
One of the debates in contemporary feminist theory is whether women can be
described as an interest-based group whose similar interests would require political
representation in well-established democracies. 60 The key issue for women’s political
participation is no longer women’s rights to be represented as individuals possessing
the right to vote and the right to stand in elections, but rather becomes their
representation as an interest group. 61

From this point of departure, the “gender

debate” on whether women as a group have different interests than men or other
groups, becomes relevant. For this reason, gender is first defined and discussed here.
Gender refers to “socially learned behavior and expectations that distinguish
between masculinity and femininity,” 62 whereas sex is understood as the biological
distinction between males and females. 63 In other words, biological ‘sex’ refers to
60

Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy, Polity Press, 1991, 1997 p.70. (The author shows
the link between democracy and feminism. She points out that democracy and feminism have
much in common as they both deal with the notions of equality and they both oppose arbitrary
power. However, they did not develop in tandem. She points out that the ancient Greeks and
early liberals have adopted democracy without the inclusion of women for example. She
contends that gender challenges the existing political theory as political theorists consider that
gender is irrelevant to the political thought.)
61
See Virginia Sapiro, When are interests interesting: The Problem of Political
Representation of Women, 75 The American Political Science Review 701, 701-16 (1981).
62
V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues 5 (George A. Lopez ed.,
Westview Press. 1999). (The authors argue that Gender is the lens through which politics
should be viewed. Because it will examine how the world is shaped by gendered concepts and
practices.)
63
Id.
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genetic and anatomical characteristics, whereas socially-learned gender is an acquired
identity gained through performing prescribed gender roles. 64

Gender inequality

originates from the social constructions of how individuals are taught culturally
appropriate attitudes and behaviors depending on their gender. 65
The under-representation of women in politics is one of the consequences of
the unequal structure of power that underlies the relationship between women and
men. 66 Some scholars contend that gender is the basis for relations of inequality
between males and females because societies place different values on masculine and
feminine behaviors. 67 As such, the link between gender and inequality is obvious
when women’s representation is very weak and unequal to men. Women, therefore,
constitute a historically disadvantaged group.
Building on this determination of gender, some feminists have argued that
women constitute a particular group grounding their argument on the “shared interests
theory.” 68 They argue that women have common interests resulting from a history of
disadvantageous status resulting from the “characteristics of gender relations.” 69
Moreover, they argue that women share common interests and concerns due to the
kind of social role they play with an emphasis on their domestic and child-rearing
responsibilities. 70 They point out that, in fact, it is women who become pregnant and
it is women who give birth.
Here, I argue that women do constitute a unique group—not based on their
shared interests—but rather by simply being women who have been historically
excluded politically because they are women. I argue that shared interests theory
excludes from the group women who may hold varied interests and goals.
Even if it is assumed that some women may share a determined set of interests
64

Id.
Id.
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Anne Philips, the politics of Presence, 100 (Oxford University Press 1995).
69
See Anne Marie Goetz, Women’s Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework, in NO
SHORTCUTS TO POWER: AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 29, (Anne
Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim eds, London: Zed Books 2003).
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See Mala N. Htun and Mark P. Jones, Engendering the Right to Participate in Decisionmaking: Electoral Quotas and Women’s Leadership in Latin America in GENDER AND THE
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Molyneux eds., Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002).

14

such as marriage and pregnancy, such interests are not determinative in making all
women a distinct social group.

Single or career-driven women may not have the

same objectives as married or housewives, yet they are nevertheless still women.
Therefore, while shared-interest theory may correctly identify some shared goals
between women of a particular social or economic class, it excludes women who may
not choose to be part of such a class. 71
Hence the shared interests’ theory opens the door to considerable critics,
which in the end undermines the contention that women constitute a group.

The

argument that gender is a sufficient criterion to demonstrate that women constitute a
group set solid grounds to the contention that women constitute a group. I argue that
women constitute a distinctive group based on their historical and systematic political
exclusion in many societies in spite of their varied goals and interests.

B. Representation Theory (Deliberation Theory) 72
Women’s under-representation is seen in the disproportionate gender representation
between constituents and elected. 73

Also, the striking homogeneity of existed

representatives suggests that historically disadvantaged groups are not represented. 74
If there were no differences between black people and white people, between Copts
and Muslims or between women and men, then those elected would be a more
random sample than those who are elected. 75 The consistent under-representation of
any social category establishes that there is a problem. Some feminists contend that
sexual differentiation in conditions and experience has produced a woman’s point of
71

Women are not a homogeneous group; attempts to increase the descriptive representation of
women must take account of variations among women. Failure to do so causes what Dovi
calls an inclusion problem and amounts to an essentialist account of what it is to be a woman
suggesting a binary and ‘natural’ division between the sexes. Feminists are well aware that
‘[w]omen differ when they have children or do not, are divorced or not, have been raped or
not, are straight or gay, obese or thin, Muslim or Christian, menopausal or prepubescent’
available at: http://faculty.washington.edu/mbarreto/courses/Dovi_2002.pdf
72
Pitkin, supra note 4, at 65. Hanna Pitkin provides, one of the most straightforward
definitions: to represent is simply to “make present again.” On this definition, political
representation is the activity of making citizens' voices, opinions, and perspectives “present”
in the public policy making processes.
73
Phillips, supra note 56, at 53.
74
Id.at 65.
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view that needs to be represented. 76
It has been argued that democratic political institutions that lack
representatives from historically disadvantaged groups-- such as women--are unjust.77
Furthermore, these arguments often assume that an increase in the number of
representatives from historically disadvantaged groups can contribute to their
substantive representation. 78 Hence it is argued that descriptive representation leads to
substantive representation to under-represented groups. 79
To evaluate the claim that there is a need for more women representing
women, it is necessary to discuss different arguments about representation itself. For
some feminists, a distinction is made between an understanding of representation as
“acting on behalf of” and an understanding of representation as “standing for.” 80 For
“acting on behalf of” the elected representative is a trustee, authorized to use her
judgment when acting on behalf of electors; whereas for “standing for” she is a
delegate strictly attached to those who elect her.
Another way to present this is to distinguish between descriptive
representation and a substantive representation. 81 Descriptive representation occurs
when representatives mirror the background of the represented. 82

Whereas,

substantive representation is considered as “acting in the interests of the represented
in a manner responsive to them.” 83 Women are thought to be represented when
deliberations about public policy consider the potential impact on different groups of
women.
Feminists have contended that a necessary condition for the representation of
76
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women’s interests is the presence of women in decision-making bodies. 84 They argue
that interests are realized in the course of deliberation and decision-making, as various
implementation strategies and competing concerns are discussed. Only when present
may women benefit from such realization and promote their interests. 85
For other feminists, the argument is as follows: if there are binding mandates,
as assumed in the “delegate” model, it will not matter who representatives are as they
represent the views of those who elected them. 86 They argue that in contemporary
electoral politics there are no binding mandates and as a consequence, representatives
exercise judgment.
The question then becomes on what grounds elected representatives are
expected to reflect women’s views and interests and address their demands. In wellestablished democracies, it is often argued that elected representatives should express
the full range of opinions of their constituents, and hence women’s views should be
included. This form is called a “politics of ideas,” 87 whereby elected representatives
are expected to show impartiality because of the absence of commitment to any
specific group. 88 However, members of underrepresented groups have challenged
this argument. They argue that the majority of elected representatives represent the
portion of the population they come from. 89
Contrary to this “politics of ideas” is the “politics of presence.” For the politics
of presence, elected representatives display the characteristics of members of
underrepresented groups in order to counter the partiality of those who dominate the
elected bodies. Quotas are aligned with the politics of presence. Gender quotas
permit the representation of women by women as the best means to reflect and
represent women’s views and varied interests in elected bodies without depending on
the actual elected representatives of middle-class men. 90 A necessary condition for
the representation of women’s views and interests is the presence of women in
decision-making bodies. 91

Views and interests are realized in the course of
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deliberation and decision-making, as various options, implementation strategies and
competing concerns are discussed. Only when present may women benefit from such
realization and promote their interests. 92
Feminists also debated for the deliberative democracy. However, opponents to
deliberative democracy contend that public choice, or public opinion, should be the
basis for a democratic society. 93
Some, feminists argue against the determination of interests and term the
failure for identifying precisely women’s interests as “uncrystallized” interests. 94 If
women at both the mass elite level have a shared political interest that is not fully
“crystallized” into a coherent set of policy demands then representatives from other
groups i.e. men cannot unproblematically undertake the representation of women. 95
In line with the argument for the presence of women and for the descriptive
representation of women, it is argued that gender differences signal convictions’
differences as to gender roles. 96 As such women and men hold different views with
regards to gender roles. For this reason, women representatives are best to reflect the
point of view of female constituents. As such, a challenge is made to the conception
of representation that argues that the gender of the representative does not matter and
that representation depends upon ideas but not the gender of the representative.

92

Women do have a point of view that is different from men’s point of view. A very
interesting study found that: “in terms of attitudes to traditional gender roles, on average men
and women differ, and women representatives are more like women voters and male
representatives are more like male voters. Such differences diminish but continue when we
control for age and party. On average, male representatives, and would-be representatives, do
not report the same level of hostility to traditional gender roles as women voters; hence, they
may, on average, be less likely than women representatives to act for, or otherwise represent,
women voters on the many issues affected by such roles.” Therefore, the argument of politics
of presence finds its’ reasoning. Women and men on average have different ideas about the
roles of each sex therefore women’s interests from women’s points of view would only be
represented by women. Rosie Campbell, Sarah Childs and Joni Lovenduski, Do Women Need
Women Representatives?, 40 British Journal of Political Science 171, 171-94 (2010).
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C. Equality Theory:
The third vein of theories in relation to the importance of gender quota is the theory of
equality. The question of defining equality and thus inequality has long been the
preoccupation of feminist jurisprudence.
Feminist jurisprudence has links to several categories of legal scholarship. 97 It
shares with “law and social sciences” scholarship an emphasis on the connections
between law and society and the ways in which law is non-autonomous. 98 Feminist
jurisprudence use empirical data to reveal how women are affected by law and by
law’s absence. 99 As discussed, women’s representation in the parliaments around the
world is between two and ten percent. An empirical finding that is analyzed to reveal
how women’s representation is affected by the law’s absence to guarantee equal
representation between women and men.
Feminist jurisprudence in relation to legal equality is then used to argue for the
adoption of gender quotas.

This thesis contends that the absence of laws that

guarantees numeric equal representation of women is the reason for the underrepresentation of women.

This absence of law also possibly amounts to

discrimination against women. But here the question to ask is how women get to be
equal before identifying the means and measures by which women get to be equal to
men. The question feminism posts is what kind of equality actually women want.
Feminists formulate the equality question as follows: should women
emphasize their similarity to men or their differences from men? 100

It is the

sameness-differences debate that forms feminist legal theories of equality. In feminist
jurisprudence the sameness-difference debate has taken the form of a debate between
97

This thesis is using Catharine Mackinnon’s suggested definition of feminist jurisprudence:
“feminist jurisprudence is an examination of the relationship between law and society form
the point of view of all women.”
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formal equality for women and substantive equality for women. In other words the
debate between equal treatment and special treatment. 101
There are four schools of feminist thought that have produced different
understandings of equality: liberal theory, radical theory, cultural theory, and postmodern theory. 102
Liberal feminists believe that women and men are rights bearing, autonomous
human beings. 103 Equal rights and equal opportunity are central for liberal legal
thought. 104 Liberal feminists build on these concepts and argue that women are just
as rational as men and that women should have equal opportunity with men to
exercise their right to make rational choices. 105 For liberal feminists, women are
equal to men and therefore the law is gendered and unjust by treating women
differently. 106
However, this thesis challenges liberal feminism’s stance on equality.

To

argue that women are similar to men is merely to assimilate women into an
unchanged male sphere, which will results in making women into men.

107

Liberal

feminism makes men the norm to which women should adhere without paying
attention to the different needs and interests of women.
For liberal feminism women are the same as men. The law would be gendered
and unjust by treating women as different, even if it served their interests.108
According to liberal feminism, gender quotas do not do right to women as they imply
that women and men are not equal. They contend that women should not be treated
differently than men, and therefore women should not benefit from special measures
that are not conferred similarly to men. Liberal feminists approve the adoption of
different actions for the support of women in politics that have as, a goal equal,
opportunity. For example, these actions consist of various measures to increase
leadership and representation opportunities such as skills training for women and
101

This debate was originated with the question of maternity and state policy on this issue.
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financial support. 109 However, they do not approve of affirmative actions that aim at
guaranteeing seats for women and see them as emphasizing that women are not equal
to men.
Contrary to liberal feminism, cultural feminism focuses on women’s
differences; it argues that noticing and valuing differences associated with women or
typical of women’s lives are critical to real equality. 110 Using equality rhetoric,
cultural feminists argue for material changes in present conditions that support
women-valued relationships. 111 Liberal feminism is different from cultural feminism
in that it focuses on the similarity between women and men and not the difference
between them.
For cultural feminism the focus is on women’s differences. It argues for
material changes in present conditions that would support women. According to
cultural feminism, gender quotas are considered as a means to value women’s
differences.
The third feminist theory is radical feminism or dominance theory. For radical
feminism both liberal and cultural feminism have their focus in the wrong place. It
contends that “it is not about difference, it’s about dominance.” 112 They contend that
the key to women’s inequality is women’s lack of power. It further argues that we
should pay attention should be paid to power relations and devising means of
empowerment or redress for the abuse of power. 113
Therefore, radical feminists argue for the means of redress for the abuse of
power. 114 For them, gender quotas are necessary to redress the abuse of power and
dominance of men. 115
The fourth feminist theory is post-modern feminism.

Postmodernism

challenges the existence of grand theory or a unitary truth. 116 It does not focus on the
109
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category “woman,” rather it focuses on the situated realities of women in the plural. 117
It challenges any attempt to define women and contends that any definition is limiting
the definition of women. It challenges the existence of a “woman” category and a
woman’s point of view. For these reasons, postmodernists generally will not accept
gender quotas that actually address a woman category and women’s needs, interests
and point of views.
Legal feminist theories have differently viewed equality. Thus the
implications for gender quotas differ as well. Gender quotas as affirmative actions
are not agreed upon unanimously as realizing equality for women by the four theories.
The idea of guaranteeing the selection of women representatives in elections is
controversial. The four feminists schools have different analyses of equality. Thus
when applied to gender quotas, they produce different hypotheses about the legality of
gender quotas.
Another trait in the debate of gender quotas and equality among feminists is
based on the merit concept. On the one hand, opponents of electoral gender quotas
argue that positions should be held based on merit that are easily measured. 118 On the
other hand, proponents of electoral gender quotas argue that existing systems are
unfair in the way they assess women as they set too narrow an understanding of merit
by ignoring how women’s and men’s merit differ. 119 Sometimes it is also claimed
that gender, in itself, constitutes merit since political systems ought to reflect the
views of the entire population. 120
The debates about merit relate to the understanding of discrimination.
Opposing gender quotas, liberal feminists argue that what is needed is an equal
society which treats all people equally. Equal treatment means a gender-blind policy
that does not discriminate based on gender. Discrimination is understood as the
different treatment of equals; affirmative action is presented as treating women
differently than men, which constitutes a form of discrimination. 121 Consequently,
affirmative action is considered as an exemption to anti-discrimination statutes in a
given country.
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Cultural feminists see that it is important to reframe affirmative action
discourse so that it moves beyond the discrimination/anti-discrimination debate
towards doing justice for women. 122 Cultural and radical feminists have made several
recommendations: firstly, to shift the focus from non-discrimination to a “right to be
treated as an equal”; secondly, to stress the special contributions of women in maledominated arenas while shifting the focus from discriminating against women to the
benefits of including women; and finally, to transfer the burden of proof from those
advocating equality to those defending the status quo. The aim is to broaden the
perspective by shifting the focus from women “needing help” to unfair social rules. 123
This thesis argues that presenting affirmative action, as an exemption to antidiscrimination principles is, in itself, a problem. 124 That social rules are generally fair
but some people face incidental blockages and barriers that hold them back - barriers
that might be described as “social differences that pervade law.” 125
It further argues that affirmative action can also be viewed from a different
perspective. It can be viewed not as a form of “special help” for needed groups but
rather as a form of redress to well-established social privileges. 126 In this way,
affirmative action is not a form of “preferential treatment” and thus discrimination positive or otherwise; its aim is to achieve justice.
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IV. Constitutionality of the Gender Quota in Egypt
This chapter examines the constitutional texts that deal with citizenship and women’s
rights to trace how successive constitutions formulated women’s equality particularly
with regards to women’s political participation. The challenge to the constitutionality
of gender quotas from an Egyptian feminist perspective is also examined. I argue that
gender quotas are constitutional for two reasons: Egyptian women have had a
disproportionate, subjugated political status to Egyptian men. And, the Egyptian legal
system has absorbed this gender-power differential. Therefore, I contend that gender
quotas are necessary to redress a situation of power inequality

A. Egyptian Women’s Constitutional History
When and how women have been presented in Egypt’s constitutional texts reveals the
history of women political rights. At the present time, the basic right to legal-political
equality, to vote and to run for political positions, is taken for granted. However, this
basic right to political equality between men and women has not always been the
case. Egyptian women have faced differential legal treatment when it comes to
citizenship.127
The first time Egyptian women were granted the right to vote and stand for
political positions was in 1956. These rights were granted by virtue of the 1956
Constitution. Before the 1956 Constitution women were not treated in the same way
as men. Women did not have the same citizenship rights as men and were not
permitted to vote or run for political positions. It was via the 1956 Constitution that
women were granted political right and became eligible to participate in politics.
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The list is long. For example women do not have the same legal rights as men in relation
to: divorce, marriage, travel and conferring the Egyptian nationality to their children. For
example regarding divorce, an Egyptian man can divorce his wife without her presence and
without the need to stand before a judge. However, an Egyptian woman cannot divorce her
husband unless she files a legal case and it takes not less than three months for the judge to
grant her the divorce.
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Before the formulation of the 1956 Constitution, Egypt had another
constitution, the Constitution of 1923. 128 Women’s rights were completely ignored in
the latter. 129 The 1923 Constitution stated in Article 3 that Egyptians are all equal
before the law regarding their civil and political rights without discrimination based
on race, language or religion. The rest of the 1923 Constitution never mentioned
women or their rights. Although, Articles 74 and 82 did grant universal suffrage to
all elected members of the Senate, a subsequent electoral law issued on April 30,
1923 restricted suffrage to males only. 130 The absence of constitutional reference to
gender equality permitted the adoption of such a law. By not including “gender” or
“sex” as one of the prohibited basis of discrimination the Constitution of 1923 left
space for discriminating against women.

Which occurred when electoral laws

allowed only males to participate in the public suffrage. Hence, in the 1923 Egyptian
Constitution, women were excluded from participating in the democratic process on
the basis of sex alone.
The 1956 Constitution was the first to mention women’s equal political rights.
Article 3 stated “Egyptians are equal with no differences made based on gender.” In
compliance to the 1956 Constitution, article one of the electoral law no. 73 for the
year 1956 stated that every Egyptian male or female has the right to practice his or her
political rights. 131
The reason for including women’s constitutional and legal equality was
political. The regime at that time had adopted a socialist system that promoted
equality between citizens. The regime believed in social equality that included both
men and women. 132 The feminist movement that started in 1923 that had as its main
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objective obtaining equal legal rights may also have played a part. 133 Nonetheless, it
was the state’s policy at that time to confer women the same rights to vote and stand
for political positions as men.
The 1971 Constitution also laid down the principle of equality and citizenship
as a core value of the State. 134 It maintained the gender equality enshrined in the 1956
Constitution. According to the 1971 Constitution, all Egyptians are equal before the
law without discrimination based on sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.
By including gender as a basis for equality, the 1956 constitution and the 1971
constitution laid down the principle of equality between women and men.
A new stipulation specifically geared towards women’s representation was
added. Article 62 left the door open for the adoption of gender quotas in specific
cases.

It stated that “The law may adopt a system that combines between the

individual and the party-list systems at such ratio as may be specified by the law.
Such a system may also include a minimum limit for women’s participation in both
councils.” A new development in the constitutional text, was a minimum number of
women is allowed in the People’s Assembly. Thereby, the constitution of 1971
permitted the adoption of the gender quota.
The 1971 constitution was in force until the uprising of 25 January 2011. After
the uprising a new constitution was formed, the constitution of 2012. Article 33 of
the 2012 constitution stated that “all citizens are equal before the law, they have equal
rights and duties without discrimination.” The 2012 constitution does not articulate,
specifically, the basis of discrimination prohibited.

Shocking absence that leaves

space for interpretation. It risks repeating the 1923 constitutional scenario whereby
the absence of specific articulation in relation to gender discrimination, and thus
gender equality, leaves the door open to legal discrimination based on sex.
Out of the four constitutions that Egypt has had, only two specifically protect
women from any discrimination based on their sex; only one established gender
quotas. The policy is not new: quotas for peasants and workers in the People’s
133
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Assembly was established in the 1956 constitution and continues until the present
time. However, the 1971 constitution left the decision of adopting the gender quota to
the public authority, whereas it obliged the public authority to adopt the peasants and
workers’ quota. 135

B. The Constitutionality of Gender Quotas
In Egypt gender quotas are believed to be unconstitutional for violating the principle
of equality. 136 This belief was originated in the SCC’s ruling over several articles in
law no. 114 of 1983.
The women’s quota has always been the subject of controversy. It has been
criticized for violating the principles of democracy as it prejudices the equality
between candidates to run for elections equally without privileges. 137 In Egypt, the
women’s quota in the People’s Assembly was adopted two times: in 1984 and in
2008. The quota of 1984 was abolished in 1987 by a decision of the Constitutional
Court. 138 The quota of 2008 was abolished with the dissolution of the People’s
Assembly following the 2011 Revolution, and has been not re-adopted in subsequent
electoral laws.
While the 1987 women’s quota was abolished by a Constitutional Court
ruling, the Court did not rule over the constitutionality of the quota itself. It is true
that it found unconstitutional a number of articles in law no. 114 of 1983 that created
the women’s quota. But it did not render the entire law unconstitutional, nor did it
rule over the quota.

In fact the Court decided upon another matter, i.e. the

discrimination between independent candidates and party-listed candidates as the law
allowed only party-listed candidates to run for elections. In making its decision - No.
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131/6Q of May 1987 - the Court relied on the principle of equality of opportunity as
guaranteed by articles 8, 40 and 62 of the Constitution. 139
The ruling was made with regard to discrimination between independent
candidates and party-listed candidates and not with regard to the quota for women. In
fact, the court decided not to rule on women’s quota for the “absence of legal
interest.” 140 For this reason, the unconstitutionality of the women’s quota in Egypt
should not be assumed. The court did not rule on women’s quota; the government
annulled the entire law, including the allocation of seats to women. But it was not
because the law was deemed entirely unconstitutional.

It can be seen that the

government chose not to risk the challenging of unconstitutionality of gender quotas
in the future.
A quota for women to participate in the political realm did not stay ignored.
In 2008, for the second time, legislative women’s quota was adopted. Sixty-four
women entered the People’s Assembly following 2010 elections. However, their
presence was short-lived. The 2010 People’s Assembly was dissolved by the 2011
Egyptian uprising the following year. A new People’s Assembly was elected and a
new constitution was drafted. The elections were organized by the constitutional
declaration of March 2011. 141 Yet again, however, the constitutional declaration
maintained the fifty percent peasants and workers’ quota and abolished the women’s
quota. The 2012 Constitution did the same: it maintained the peasants and workers’
quota and abolished the women’s quota.
The legality of the peasants and workers’ quota, which remains until the
present day, has not been contested for sixty years since they were introduced in the
1956 constitution. However, the quota for women, which was also created to
guarantee the representation of half of the Egyptian population, has not received the
same level of acceptance and longevity.
Though the Supreme Constitutional Court did not rule over the
constitutionality of the gender quota, the question of the constitutionality of the
gender quota should be discussed. If the court had had to rule over the quota, what
139
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would have been its ruling? Do gender quotas conform to the constitutional concept
of equality?
The plaintiff’s argued that the gender quota violated the principle of equality.
He also argued that the electoral law violated the principle of equality as it allowed
only for party-listed candidates to run for elections. Which legally prevented
independent candidates from running for elections. The defendant-- the government-claimed that it is within its jurisdiction to regulate the electoral system. And therefore,
restricting the right to run for elections to party-list candidates is within its
jurisdiction.
The court did not rule on the gender quota. However, it decided that the article
stipulating that only party-listed candidates were allowed to run for elections is
unconstitutional as it violates the principle of equality between citizens.
I, therefore, will discuss the reasoning of the court with regard to equality and
then apply it to the gender quota to examine its constitutionality.
The SCC reasoned as follows: the right to run for elections is a constitutional
political right. Restricting this right to some citizens and excluding others is a
violation of the principles of equal opportunity and equality. The SCC based its
decision on Articles 62, 40 and 8. 142
The SCC ruled that the right to candidacy is a constitutional right conferred to
all citizens as stated in Article 62 of the constitution. The SCC added that the state’s
jurisdiction for regulating candidacy must not violate the principle of equality and
equal opportunity guaranteed by Articles 40 and 8 of the constitution.
If the SCC was to respond to the plaintiff and rule over gender quotas it would
have ruled that the gender quota was constitutional. It would also base its decision on
Articles 62 and 40. Article 62 states clearly that the electoral system may adopt the
142

Article 62 stated that: “Citizens shall have the right to vote and express their opinions in
referendums according to the provisions of the law. Their participation in public life is a
national duty. The law shall regulate the right of candidacy to the People’s Assembly and the
Shura Council according to the electoral system it specifies. The law may adopt a system that
combines between the individual and the party- list systems at such ratio as may be specified
by the law. Such system may also include a minimum limit for the women’s participation in
both councils.” Article 40 stated that: “All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal
public rights and duties without discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic origin, language,
religion or creed.” Article 8 stated that: “The State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to
all citizens.” Available at: http://www.sis.gov.eg/en/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=208

29

gender quota. Furthermore, it would have added that the adoption of the gender quota
is within the state’s jurisdiction.
But if I go further and presume that the constitutional text that allows for the
adoption of the gender quota did not exist this would allow an actual discussion of the
gender quota’s conformity with the concept of equality. I argue that gender quota lies
at the heart of the concept of equality. As discussed in chapter two, the gender quota
does justice by redressing a situation of unequal representation. What is granted to
men or other citizens by law should, in turn, be granted to women by law. For
example, if there is a law granting Egyptian nationality to children of Egyptian men,
another law should also grant Egyptian nationality to the children of Egyptian women.
If there is a legal text that guarantees a quota for men or a group of citizens,
then a legal text should exist in turn for a quota for women. This is the constitutional
principle of equality and citizenship. If a legal quota exists for peasants and workers,
then a legal quota for other categories should be established.
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V. Gender Quotas and Political Islam
In this chapter, I argue that the political historical context in which women are viewed
and treated in society matters as much as the theoretical and constitutional arguments
for the adoption of the gender quota in Egypt. To do so, the stance of Egypt’s
dominant political party, the Muslim Brotherhood, 143 on women’s political
143
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participation and representation will be presented through a textual analysis of
political Islam. First, I analyze the writings of Hassan Al-Banna, the founding father
of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 1928, with respect to women’s political
representation. Second, I assess the Freedom and Justice Party’s (hereinafter, “FJP”)
political program, and its official statement with regards to women to ascertain a
dominant position with regards to women’s political representation and gender
quotas. On the basis of this political-historical analysis, I argue that the gender quota
should be readopted in Egypt.

A. Hassan Al-Banna’s Views on Women’s Equality
During his life, Al-Banna thought that the solution for Egyptian society was its return
to Islamic morals in every aspect of life as a way to correct the confusion that
engulfed Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s. 144 To his Muslim Brotherhood followers in
the past and present, Hassan Al-Banna "charismatic and appealing to the masses of
believers" is a perfect model “of the combination of religious conviction with moral
courage and public engagement, . . . his ideology as exemplifying Islamic ideals.” 145
As a charismatic leader who founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement and
shaped its ideology, Al-Banna was greatly missed after his death. The organization
worked to find a new leader who had the same vision and ability to motivate
Egyptians to take action in pushing for an Islamic State. 146
In the twenty years that Hassan Al-Banna led the Muslim Brotherhood, the
organization experienced tremendous growth.

It is estimated that by 1948 the

organization had 1,700 to 2,000 branches with approximately a million followers in
Egypt. 147
As the founding father of the Muslim Brotherhood, the writings of Hassan AlBanna with regards to women’s rights are illuminating. In fact, Al-Banna’s writings
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are foundational to trace the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on women’s equality. The
Muslim Brotherhood express their official stance in relation to any given matter in
two ways, either in the form of Messages from the Supreme Guide or in the form of
official statements from the organization itself. 148

Any official endorsement by the

Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood is to be considered as an authoritative,
undisputed source of reference on the Muslim Brotherhood’s viewpoint on any
matter. 149 The official endorsement of the Supreme Guide takes the form/title of
“Messages from the Guide” or rissalah min al murshid. In addition, there are the
documents or the official statements that have “Message from the Brotherhood,”
rissalah min al ikhwan inscribed on them. 150
Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has had eight Supreme Guides.151
The most influential is considered to be Hassan Al-Banna, as the first Supreme Guide
and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. In relation to women’s issues, Al-Banna
was the only Supreme guide who wrote about women in his Messages, establishing a
policy of action towards women. He wrote four messages to announce his position
vis-à-vis the debate about women’s rights on several occasions. 152 These Messages
are: “The Muslim Women at a Crossroad” or al mar’a al muslima ‘ala moftarak
tarekayn, “Message to Feminists” or resalat lel nesa’eyat, and “Da’wa purposes: The
Muslim Family” or men ahdaf al da’wa: al ‘osra al muslima which is a series of two
messages. 153
In his first Message, “The Muslim Woman at a Crossroad,” he declared that
there are two paths for the Muslim woman. The first is to follow Islam with its
traditions and its rules protecting women, and the second is to follow the example of
the Western woman whom he viewed as epitomizing all misconduct. He advocated
148
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the path of Islam as a safeguard to women, for their own protection and benefit. He
emphasized that women in Islam have a noble task of taking care of the family, a role
undermined in the West and privileged by Islam. 154
Hassan Al-Banna in this message contended that women in Islam are
protected by its rules. Hassan Al-Banna contended that women are treated differently
than man for their own protection. I argue that this protective approach is used to
justify different or unequal treatment between men and women in the name of
religion. Hassan Al-Banna’s personnel views of women’s rights are presented as if
they are the rules of Islam. Which confer them a special importance and divinity. His
views in regards to women’s rights are very restricting. He believes that women’s
place is at home denying her any public exposure or participation. He also emphasizes
his stance in the following message.
His second Message, “Message to Feminists” was dedicated to opposing the
status of free mixing between men and women. He argued for a strict segregation
between sexes for the good of women and for their own protection. He emphasized
that women’s role, according to Islam, is not in the public sphere and that they should
hold on to their role at home. Women’s role, for him, was a noble role; women were
the caregivers, the wives and mothers of future Muslim generations. 155
Yet again, he uses the protective approach by which women should not
participate in the public sphere for their own benefit and for their own protection. It
should be questioned why would not Hassan Al-Banna thought of changing the
discourse as follows: men should not participate in the public sphere for their own
protection. If he spoke out of religion, he should have spoken out of the concepts of
justice and equality. Therefore, he should have asked men not to participate in the
public sphere, or at least not to participate in the public sphere where there are
women, for men’s protection. In addition, I argue that Hassan Al-Banna did not
discuss the elements of protection i.e. from what exactly are women protected? If the
answer is women should be protected from men, then Hassan Al-Banna was supposed
to direct his messages to men and not to women. Therefore, I argue that his focus and
objective might be to restrict women’s rights. This belief emancipates from the
absence of a serious discussion regarding the issues faced by the Muslim society, as
he sees it, if women were to enter the public sphere and the means to overcome these
154
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issues. This contention is especially significant in his third message.
The third Message was a very important one. Hassan Al Banna wrote it on the
occasion of two major women’s rights debates in the People’s Assembly. The first
debate was over whether the People’s Assembly should allow women to practice the
profession of law and work as lawyers. 156 The second was over whether the People’s
Assembly would allow women the right to vote in elections. The People’s Assembly
allowed women to practice the law. 157 It refused, however, to confer the right to vote
to women.
Commenting on the People’s Assembly’s first decision, Hassan Al-Banna
rejected the People’s Assembly’s approval of women’s right to practice the law
basing his argument on the principle of segregation. 158 In response to the debate on
women’s right to vote he re-emphasized women’s role as being to take care of the
house and raise her “boys” to be the future “male” citizens and “male” leaders. He
argued that male citizens do not exercise their right to vote correctly and he added that
the majority of men do not vote in elections. Hence, he contended that, the priority
should not be to grant women the right to vote, rather it should be to teach men the
“right” way to vote and its importance. Moreover, he argued that caring about
“women’s rights” was a waste of time and effort. He summed up by stating that what
should be granted to women is the knowledge of how to run her household and care
for her family. This message is considered as an emphasis to the contention that
Hassan Al-Banna’s aim was to restrict women’s rights-- without any true religious
reference. He believes that women should take care of their sons, omitting any
reference to women’s taking care of their daughters. I argue that by this message he
clarified that the society he sees is a society of men where there is no place for women
and girls but to take care of men and boys.
Finally, the fourth Message was a response to those who called for women’s
equality denying that she inherited half of what the man inherited and that the
testimony taken from one man was to be taken by two women. He argued that Islam
treated women and men equally but differently. And that, the difference in treatment
156
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only does justice to women. He contended “the difference between men and women
in rights is attributable to their different natures and in accordance with the different
roles assigned to each.” 159
Hassan Al-Banna wrote, stating his opinions, that he believed that women in
Islam are equal to men, but they are differently treated. However, this difference
made in treatment between men and women is in favor of equality and justice. He
argues that women should not be treated the same as men for their biological
differences and for their different duties and roles. Hence, it is concluded that he
opted for equality based on the difference approach and not the sameness approach.
He also contended against western women and depicted them as the worst example of
women’s equality.
In regard to women’s right to representation, Hassan Al-Banna rejected
women’s right to vote.

In consequence, Hassan Al-Banna was mostly against

women’s representation in the People’s Assembly. This approach is the approach of
most Muslim scholars in discussing women’s equality. 160 I argue that the Islamic
discourse of equality is based on two approaches. First that Islam laid the principle of
equality between men and women, in treatment them differently.

Second, that the

western theory of equality as the sameness equality did harm to women. Muslim
scholars assert that women and men are considered equal by Islam, however they
deny the approach of “identicalness” of equality. 161 They consider that men and
women are different biologically and have different duties and rights however Islam
treats them equally but in different ways. Due to the differences between men and
women equality in treatment differs as well. Islam has equated between the two sexes
but in a way that suits the nature of each sex. Hence, they oppose the formal equality
and strict formality called upon by the west. They oppose the sameness or
identicalness approach of equality between men and women. An approach they
consider as undermining women’s protection and right. 162
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B. Contemporary Muslim Brotherhood’s Stance on Gender Quota in Egypt
In this section, I examine if the current policy of the Muslim Brotherhood diverges or
complies with Hassan Al-Banna’s views.
The present policy of the Muslim Brotherhood in regard to women can be
found in the Muslim Brotherhood’s party program and in a public statement they
announced entitled “The Status of Women in Islam as Seen by The Muslim
Brotherhood.” 163
The Muslim Brotherhood contends that the party program serves as the
Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral program in which it announces the principles that
they will use in their state policy. In regards to women’s representation a keen
reading of the section of equality reveals that the Muslim Brotherhood today sees
women’s representation in a different way.
Under the section entitled “The Principles of Freedom and Equality” the
Muslim Brotherhood announces that freedom for the Egyptian is a main principal and
a right, therefore the party seeks not to discriminate between citizens based on
religion, sex or race. Furthermore, the party guarantees women’s acquisition of all
her rights without prejudice in conformity to decrees of Islam and in a way that
balances her duties and her rights. 164
A first reading of this section suggests that the present policy of the Muslim
Brotherhood follows Al-Banna’s stance in regard to women’s representation.
However, a closer reading shows this is not the case. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood
today sees women’s representation in a different way. They believe that she should
have the right to vote and the right to be represented and participate in the public
sphere. However these rights are conditional upon respecting the decrees of Islam i.e.
their husbands’ approval. 165 This development in regards to women’s representation
was reached during the discussion of two main Islamic theories i.e. the theory of
Qiwama and the theory of Wilaya.
Qiwama is a term used to refer to the leadership of men over women. It was
originated in the Quran. Verse number 34 of surat Al-Nisa’ provides that men are the
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at:

protectors and maintainers of women because Allah has given one more than the other
and because they support them with their own means. Muslim scholars have used this
verse to explain gender roles in public and in private spheres.
Some Muslim scholars hold the view that men have a leadership position over
women in the private sphere i.e. in their households and in the public sphere i.e.
women’s public participation. 166 Others consider qiwama as being restricted to the
private sphere i.e. the household. 167
At present the Muslim Brotherhood adopts a position in between, they narrow
the sphere of men’s qiwama to marital relations i.e. the private sphere. 168 However,
they also limit women’s public participation to their husbands’ approval thus
widening the scope of private qiwama.

It can be considered that the Muslim

Brotherhood adopted both the private and public scope of qiwama but they have
reframed it by allowing that men control women’s public participation as part of
men’s private scope of qiwama. The end result is a control of women by in both the
private and public spheres.
This position can also be seen as an attenuation of men’s qiwama to best serve
the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Women members of the Muslim

Brotherhood play a very important role in the welfare organizations and the access to
women in mosques—an important advantage to women that the Muslim Brotherhood
would not leave unexploited. Women Muslim Brotherhood members would mobilize
other women for to support Muslim Brotherhood candidates in elections.
For this reason, the Muslim Brotherhood limits the scope of qiwama to the
private sphere. However they do so to gain the votes of female voters who are
mobilized by women members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The second theory is the theory of Wilaya or leadership in public positions.
The Muslim Brotherhood considers that women can hold public leadership positions
with the exception of the president position. 169 They believe that the representative
position in elected bodies is a public position that a woman can hold. In the Muslim
166
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Brotherhood’s official statement regarding women entitled The Status of Women in
Islam as Seen by The Muslim Brotherhood, the question of whether women have the
right to be representatives in elected bodies is explored. They state that women are
equal to men and therefore they can be representatives. This position is easily
critiqued. If they contend that women are equal to men and therefore women can hold
a public position as a representative. This equality is not maintained for women to
hold the position of president. At the same time, no justification for this is offered.
In a four point section arguing for the representation of women, the Muslim
Brotherhood promote their views that women are equal to men in response to
criticism of women’s political representation.
Opponents to women’s representation contend that women are unfit to be
representatives as they do not have experience in public affairs.

The Muslim

Brotherhood states in response to this point that if there is a woman who does not
have experience in public affairs the same case can be for men. Not all men have
experience in public affairs, which does not prevent any of them from being
representatives. The second point is based on biological differences: Women become
pregnant and have their menstrual periods which influences their work as
representatives. The Muslim Brotherhood respond that men also get sick which also
influences their work. Getting sick does not prevent men from their right to be
representatives in elected bodies and nor should it be for women.
The third point offered by opponent is that the principle of segregation
between men and women prevents women from running for elections. The Muslim
Brotherhood responds that segregation can be respected and implemented by
reserving a special order and placement of seats in the people’s Assembly, which does
not prevent women from running for elections as well. Contrarily, they also make
two remarks regarding women’s role. They point out that a woman’s ultimate goal is
to be a caregiver to the Muslim family. In a final remark that they reject the model of
Western women in both treatment and social status.
Today’s Muslim Brotherhood has broadened the application of equality in
comparison to Hassan El Banna’s position. They recognize that women have the
right to vote and stand for elections. However, they still maintain the same core
principles that women are equal to men in spite of their being treated differently.
Women’s noble and main role in Muslim society is domestic as a caregiver to her
family and that the Western model of women’s equality is a degrading one, that does
39

not protect women and is totally rejected.
The representation of ideas on gender roles of the Muslim Brotherhood today
is different from Hassan Al Banna’s views on gender roles. However, the essence of
the message bears similarities especially in regards to women’s role as a caregiver of
the family.
After such a difference in women’s representation one would expect broad
support for equal numbers of women Muslim Brotherhood members running as
candidates in elections and ultimately more women from the Muslim Brotherhood
represented in the People’s Assembly. One would also expect greater support for
women’s representation in leadership positions within the Muslim Brotherhood. This
has not been the case. The first time the Muslim Brotherhood supported a woman to
run for election only was in 2005. And they supported only one woman, Makarem El
Deiry. 170 Moreover, in the elections of 2012, women represented only 13.6 percent of
the Muslim Brotherhoods’ candidate lists. 171
Another way to learn how the Muslim Brotherhood sees women’s political
representation is to examine how women are represented in upper positions in Muslim
Brotherhood.

In fact, there has never been a female member in the Guidance

Bureau. 172 Women members have been excluded from holding important posts of
power within the movement including representation in the Guidance Bureau from
inception of the Muslim Brotherhood to the present day.
Moreover, “the status of women as seen by the Muslim Brotherhood”
statement contains a very important point. It states that the husband has a right to
permit his wife to work. This right is to be regulated by an agreement between the
husband and the wife. Such rights should not be regulated by law and the authorities
should not interfere with them except in some rare cases.” 173 In other words, the
Muslim Brotherhood considers the state policy to be not interfering in married life.
And that there must not be any constitutional or legal guarantee of women’s right to
work.
In regard to gender quotas specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood opposes
them. This thesis argues that the Muslim Brotherhood opposes the adoption of gender
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quotas adoption because they have been against women’s political representation and
women’s public participation from the start. Though the Muslim Brotherhood has
fielded female candidates in several elections, this can be viewed as a token gesture to
show that the Muslim Brotherhood does support women’s political representation but
only superficially. They paint a picture of women’s support to win the sympathy of a
wider audience.
From my point of view, I contend that the Muslim Brotherhood specifically
opposes gender quotas based on two indicators: first, they contend that the role of
women is in the home; they deny her the right to freely participate in the public
sphere and when she does, it is conditional to her husband’s approval. And secondly,
they oppose the concept of quotas, in general, as it was shown during the
deliberations of the 2012 constitution. 174
The Muslim Brotherhood did not want to maintain the peasants and workers
quota in the People’s Assembly because they consider it against equality. They
consider it to be a violation of the principle of equality. This stance is similar to the
stance of liberal democracy that sees all rights’ holders as being equal. However, it is
not clear what the theoretical foundation is for their refusal to maintain the fifty
percent peasants and laborers’ quota that was enforced for sixty years. It may be
because they were against the Nasserite social regime that established the quota. This
period is when the Muslim Brotherhood witnessed their harshest treatment. Or it may
because they are genuinely any state social policy that contradicts against Islamic
state policy.
The two indicators show the contradiction in the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance
vis-à-vis equality. If they contend that all citizens are equal and therefore no quotas
should be established. They should also apply this liberal equality to women i.e. by
giving women the freedom to participate in the public sphere and thus be represented
politically on an equal basis without limitations.
The application of the Muslim Brotherhood’s concept of equality also differs
according to gender. They may see only men as equal; therefore they may see in
quotas favoring male peasants and workers over non-peasants and non-laborers males
a violation of the principle of equality “between men.” The quota that favors one
174
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category of men over another category of men is not legitimate. However, this malemale equality is not the same as a male-female equality. Hence, the issue of women’s
equality to men in participating in the public sphere is denied. As such, the Muslim
Brotherhood do not agree to women’s equality with men regardless of their liberal
views on equality between men.

VI. Conclusion
42

Gender quotas in parliament are considered as an immediate remedy to underrepresentation of women in politics, especially in Egypt where women have
historically remained almost non-existent in political public affairs. In other words,
the quota remedy to the problem of women’s under-representation in the parliament is
an affirmative action that aims towards equality in political representation between
men and women. Electoral gender quotas are measures intended to guarantee an
immediate increased representation of women. With regards to the equality principle,
the idea of guaranteeing the selection of women’s representatives in elections has
engendered controversy. They are viewed as bypassing competition and hence as
ignoring the merit principle which ensures that the best person is selected.
In Egypt, the gender quota has engendered controversy over its
constitutionality, as it is perceived as violating the principle of equality. This thesis
argues that the gender quota adopted in Egypt is constitutional because it complies
with the constitutional principle of equality.
Gender quotas are viewed as a mean to establish equality. There are different
theories and concepts of equality most of which consider gender quotas as being a
means to attain justice. With the exception of liberal feminism, feminism theorists
have argued in favor of gender quotas’ adoption.
Liberal feminism considers that women are equal to men thus the law is
gendered and unjust when it treats women differently. Liberal feminists see gender
quotas as a different treatment that goes against their call for equal treatment. Equal
treatment theory is critiqued from two perspectives. On the one hand, the equal
treatment theory omits women’s differences associated especially with childbearing.
On the other hand, the concept of equal treatment is itself gendered by setting men as
the objective model of equality.
Other theories, however, focus on women’s differences i.e. cultural feminism
and radical feminism. Cultural feminists argue that the valuation of women’s
differences is critical to real equality. Radical feminists argue that the issue is neither
sameness nor differences; the issue is that men dominate over women. The critical
point for understanding inequality is women’s lack of power. Cultural feminism and
radical feminism are believed to argue for treating women differently to achieve
equality; therefore, adopting gender quotas for them is accepted.
The debate persists between the theories of equality, but also in practice.
There is no better example than the Egyptian experience. The gender quota has
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engendered fierce debate on the basis of constitutional equality. Gender quotas are
considered, wrongly, as unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality.
This belief is incorrect because the SCC never ruled over the constitutionality
of the gender quota. In fact, this thesis contends that the SCC validated the concept of
quotas, in general, when it commented on the People’s Assembly’s election law. The
SCC made ten comments as part of its oversight as stated in the Constitution of 2012.
In the first comment the SCC discussed the peasants and workers quotas. 175 The
SCC’s remark focused on the legal definition of a peasant and of a worker. By
discussing the question of who falls into the legal determination of peasants and
workers, the SCC validated the peasant and workers’ quota. The SCC reviewed the
conformity of the electoral law with the constitution and did not comment over the
unconstitutionality of the peasants and workers quota. Hence, the SCC considers the
latter constitutional. By extension, gender quotas as another form of quotas are also
constitutional.
In Egypt, gender quotas have been adopted two times. The first time in 1979
out of forty-eight electoral districts/constituencies thirty-one constituencies reserved
one seat to women. In 2008, when the gender quota was adopted for the second time,
the electoral law reserved sixty-four seats to women by creating women
constituencies. In these constituencies only women competed with each other. In
both instances, the gender quota did not subsist for a long period of time.
In 1984 the SCC ruled on the constitutionality of several articles of the
electoral law that established the gender quota. However, it did not rule on the gender
quota itself. Nonetheless, there is a general misconception that the gender quota was
deemed unconstitutional.

In addition, Egyptians considered the peasants’ and

workers’ quota a way to establish equality between social categories. It is a means
that Egyptian society views as not privileging one category over another. Rather, it is
viewed as doing justice to an undermined category.
In Egypt today where an Islamic movement dominates the political landscape
it is acknowledged that the gender quota will not be re-adopted as long as the socalled Islamic movements and groups control the political arena. It is argued that the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic group that leads the political scenery, will not adopt
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gender quotas. This is due to two main reasons. The first is because their equality
interpretation, of equality itself, is based on the justification that women are unequal
with men. And the second is because they oppose the quota concept itself.
The Muslim Brotherhood has a set of rules regarding the role of each sex-men and women--in a Muslim society. Gender roles that they perceive as being
founded by Islam are the one that should be respected. The strict adherence to such
foundational beliefs is necessary for the establishment of a Muslim society.
A first reading of the statement of how the Muslim Brotherhood sees women
suggests that the present policy of the Muslim Brotherhood follows Al-Banna’s stance
in regards to women’s representation. Hassan Al-Banna had very restricted and
conservative views in regards to women.

He believed that women should not

participate at all in the public sphere and that woman’s most noble and only goal in
life is to take care of her household. He denied her the right to vote when the question
of women’s right to vote was discussed in the People’s Assembly at the time. It is
presumed that if the question of women’s representation and gender quotas had also
been discussed at the time, he would have rejected them as well.
However, the present policy of the Muslim Brotherhood is different from
Hassan Al-Banna’s policy towards women. In fact the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance
today is different in regards to women’s representation than in the past. They believe
that she should have the right to vote and the right to be represented and participate in
the public sphere. However these rights are conditional upon respecting the decrees
of Islam i.e. gaining their husbands’ approval first.
The Muslim Brotherhood discussed women’s right to be represented under the
rubric of the Islamic theory of qiwama. At present the Muslim Brotherhood adopts a
quasi-conservative position as they limit the sphere of men’s qiwama to marital
relations only i.e. the private sphere.

However, they also limit women’s public

participation with their husbands’ approval and thus widening the scope of private
qiwama. The Muslim Brotherhood adopted both the private and public scope of
qiwama but they have reframed it by affording that men control over women’s public
participation as part of men’s private scope of qiwama. The end result is control of
women by men in both the private and the public spheres.
This position can also be seen as an attenuation to men’s qiwama to best serve
the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Women members of the Muslim

Brotherhood play a very important role in the welfare organizations and in preaching
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to women in mosques. An important advantage that the Muslim Brotherhood does
not leave unexploited.

In fact, women members of the Muslim Brotherhood

commonly mobilize other women to support Muslim Brotherhood candidates in
elections.
In other words, the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood has broadened the
application of equality in comparison to Hassan Al Banna’s. As such they consider
women to have the right to vote and to stand for elections. However, they still
maintain the same core of principles that women are equal to men in spite of requiring
different treatment. Women’s noble and main role in the Muslim society is domestic
as a caregiver to her family and the Western model of women’s equality is a
degrading one for women that does not protect women and thus is totally rejected.
I contend that the Muslim Brotherhood oppose, specifically, gender quotas
because of two reasons: first, they contend that the role of women is at home and they
deny her the right to freely participate in the public sphere and if she does, it is
conditional on her husband’s approval). And secondly, they oppose the concept of
quota in general as it was shown during the deliberations of the 2012 constitution. 176
The Muslim Brotherhood does not want to maintain the peasants’ and
workers’ quota in the People’s Assembly because they consider it against equality and
they consider it as a violation to the principle of equality. However, it is not clear
what is the theoretical foundation is for their refusal to maintain the fifty percent
peasants and workers quota that has been enforced for sixty years.
The two indicators show the paradox in the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance visà-vis equality. If they contend that all citizens are equal and therefore no quotas
should be established, they should also apply this formal equality to women by
leaving women the freedom to participate in the public sphere and be represented
equally politically and without any limitations.
The contradiction in positions can be justified if the application of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s equality differs according to gender. It is possible that they see only
men as being equal therefore they do see in quotas favoring males peasants and
workers over non-peasants and non-laborers males a violation of the principle of
equality “between men.” They consider the quota that favors a category of men over
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other categories of men as not legitimate. However, this male-male equality does not
reach a male-female equality.

Hence, the issue of women’s equality with men in

participating in the public sphere is denied. As such they do not agree on women’s
equality with men regardless of their liberal views on equality between men. It is
therefore argued that the overall stance of the Muslim Brotherhood on women’s
equality delineated according to biological differences and gender roles complies with
Hassan Al-Banna’s views on women’s equality.
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